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INTRODUCTION 
Alan V. Funk, the Receiver appointed over the 49th Street Galleria, and an 
intervening party in the above-entitled action (the "Receiver"), hereby respectfully submits 
his Reply Brief of Intervenor. 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
§78-2-2(4). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
U.S. Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1, in pertinent part: 
No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Annotated §59-12-103(l)1, in pertinent part: 
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount paid or 
charged for the following: 
(f) admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation, including seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and 
other similar accommodations. 
Utah Admin. Code Rule R865-19-33S, in pertinent part: 
A. "Admission" means the right or privilege to enter into a 
place. Admission includes the amount paid for the right to use 
a reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium, theatre, circus, 
stadium, schoolhouse, meeting house, or gymnasium to view any 
type of entertainment. Admission also includes the right to use 
a table at a night club, hotel, or roof garden whether such 
*A11 future references are to the Utah Code Annotated (1992) unless otherwise 
identified. 
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charge is designated as a cover charge, minimum charge, or any 
such similar charge. 
Utah Admin. Code Rule R865-19-34S, in pertinent part: 
A. The phrase "place of amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation" is broad in meaning but conveys the basic idea of a 
definite location. 
B. The amount paid for admission to such a place is subject to 
the tax, even though such charge includes the right of the 
purchaser to participate in some activity within the place. For 
example, the sale of a ticket for a ride upon a mechanical or 
self-operated device is an admission to a place of amusement. 
C. Charges for admissions to swimming pools, skating rinks, 
and other places of amusement are subject to the tax. Charges 
for towel rentals, swimming suit rentals, skate rentals, etc., are 
also subject to tax. 
ARGUMENT DETAIL 
I. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE THIS DISPUTE, 
The Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission (the "Tax Commission") 
states that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case because the appeal was allegedly 
filed untimely. This Court, on its own motion, requested the parties to brief this issue. The 
Court has determined that it has jurisdiction to resolve this dispute. A copy of the 
Receiver's pleadings which address this issue as well as the Order issued by this Court 
denying summary disposition are attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
II. THE ISSUE OF TAXABILITY OF THE GALLERIA'S ROLLER SKATING AND 
BATTING CAGE RECEIPTS IS NOT MOOT. 
The Tax Commission states that the issue of whether the Galleria's receipts from 
roller skating and batting cages are taxable is moot since, due to conflicting advice from 
employees of the Tax Commission, the Tax Commission agreed to forgive the sales tax 
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imposed on these activities for the audit period. However, this argument is incorrect for 
several reasons. 
A. The Issue is Still Ripe Since the Tax Commission Determined that Receipts 
from Roller Skating and the Batting Cages are Taxable, 
The conflict between the Galleria and the Tax Commission is and has always been 
whether roller skating and the use of the batting cages are taxable activities. The Tax 
Commission's forgiveness of tax does not address the conflict between the parties. The Tax 
Commission continues to maintain that these are taxable activities. In fact, the Tax 
Commission has subsequently conducted a second audit of the Galleria, again imposing sales 
tax on these activities. Furthermore, a "negligence penalty" has been assessed against the 
Galleria in the second audit for alleged non-compliance with matters raised in the first 
audit. Clearly, the controversy between the parties remains notwithstanding the forgiveness 
of the tax for the first audit period. If the Tax Commission had ruled that the activities 
were not taxable, then the controversy would be moot. Having ruled that the activities are 
taxable, the issue remains ripe and is not moot. 
B. Case Law Supports a Finding that the Issue is not Moot, 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the standard for determining when an issue is 
moot. In Burkett v. Schwendiman. 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989), the Supreme Court stated: 
We refrain from adjudicating issues when the underlying case 
is moot. A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial 
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants. 
As stated above, the conflict between the parties was not resolved by the forgiveness 
of the sales tax on roller skating and batting cage receipts. Consequently, a judicial 
determination of the constitutionality of the sales tax statute will directly "affect the rights 
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of the litigants." The Tax Commission continues to maintain that roller skating and use of 
the batting cages are taxable activities. Since the conflict remains and a judicial 
determination of the issue will affect the rights of the parties, the controversy is not moot. 
C Even if the Controversy is Otherwise Mooted. An Exception to the Mootness 
Doctrine Applies to Allow Judicial Review. 
Several exceptions to the mootness doctrine have been recognized by the Utah courts. 
Assuming arguendo that the issue of the taxability of roller skating and batting cage receipts, 
is otherwise moot, an exception to the doctrine is applicable to allow this Court to resolve 
the dispute. As stated in Reynolds v. Reynolds. 788 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah App. 1990): 
In addition to those cases "capable of repetition, yet 
evading review," other exceptions to the mootness doctrine 
include cases which "may produce irreparable injury if not 
decided immediately," or where controversy continues to exist 
even after the issue has become moot for the litigants. 
. . . Where an exception to the mootness doctrine is 
present, courts historically have exercised this discretionary 
authority in "class actions, questions of constitutional 
interpretation, issues as to the validity or construction of a 
statute, or the propriety of administrative rulings." (Citations 
omitted.) 
Therefore, even if the issue of taxability is arguendo moot, the controversy of whether 
the Tax Commission's collection actions are constitutional continues. Additionally, since the 
exception applies, this Court should exercise its authority since the case at bar involves 
questions of constitutionality, validity and construction of the sales tax statute and its 
application and the propriety of administrative rulings issued by the Tax Commission. 
D. Judicial Economy Demands the Issues be Resolved Now. 
Finally, judicial economy favors resolving simultaneously the taxability issue for all 
activities in question. The Tax Commission's attempt to prevent this Court's review of the 
taxability of only roller skating and batting cage activities and not the taxability of the laser 
tag game, will require this Court to needlessly return to the same issues a second time in 
a second proceeding. The Tax Commission acknowledges that if it is successful in 
persuading this Court to not examine all these activities concurrently, additional litigation 
will be necessary. The Tax Commission states: "This issue [of whether roller skating and 
batting cage receipts are subject to sales tax] is ripe for future periods unaffected by this 
appeal." Respondent's Brief at 9, fn. 3. Consequently, for judicial economy, since the issues 
for all activities identified in the audit are identical, this Court should review them 
simultaneously. 
III. ANY DISPUTE AS TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE SHOULD BE 
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE TAXPAYER. 
The Tax Commission, while vaguely acknowledging that the term "including" can have 
more than one meaning, suggests that only it can devine what the 1933 Legislature intended 
by its use of the term "including." The Receiver has acknowledged that the term "including" 
can be used either as a word of enlargement or as a word of limitation. The Tax 
Commission cannot know with any degree of certainty that the 1933 Legislature intending 
the word "including" to be interpreted as a word of enlargement. In fact, the Attorney 
General's Draft Opinion, attached hereto as Exhibit "B," specifically states that the 1933 
Legislature used the word "including" as a word of limitation in the sales tax statute. 
Additionally, the Tax Commission incorrectly states that unless this Court adopts its 
interpretation, the rest of the statute is superfluous. This simply is not the case. A 
reasonable reading of the statute, with meaning being given to all the words of the statute, 
can be made using "including" as a word of limitation. As a word of limitation, the term 
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"including" can refer to the types of "amusement, entertainment or recreation" activities 
subject to sales tax. 
Moreover, the case law cited by the Tax Commission supports the conclusion that 
"including" has more than one meaning. In State v. Montello Salt Co.. 98 P. 549, 551 (1908), 
rev'd. 221 U.S. 452 (1911), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The word "including" is susceptible of different shades of 
meaning. Common usage has given it different meaning. It 
may be used in the sense to comprise or embrace . . .; to 
confine or to contain . . . . 
As noted in the Receiver's Brief, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Utah Supreme 
Court's determination that "including" was a word of enlargement and concluded that the 
term "including" had been used as a word of limitation. 
Since, as stated by the Utah Supreme Court, the word "including" can reasonably be 
susceptible to different meanings, it must be accorded the meaning most favorable to the 
taxpayer. As stated in Grauer v. Director of Revenue. 396 P.2d 260, 264 (Kan. 1964), cited 
in Respondent's Brief: 
Tax statutes will not be extended by implication beyond the 
clear import of language employed therein and their operation 
will not be enlarged so as to include matters not specifically 
embraced. Where there is reasonable doubt as to the meaning 
of a taxing act, it will be construed most favorably to the 
taxpayer. (Citation omitted.) . . . [T]he general rule is that if a 
taxing statute be of doubtful intent it should be construed 
favorably to the taxpayer. (Citation omitted.) 
Since there are reasonable alternative meanings, the Court must adopt the meaning 
most favorable to the taxpayer - that the term "including" was used by the 1933 Legislature 
as a word of limitation. 
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IV. THE TAX COMMISSION CANNOT EXPAND THE LAW BEYOND THE SCOPE 
OF THE STATUTE. 
The Receiver acknowledges that the legislature can delegate to the Tax Commission 
the duty to create rules and regulation implementing the legislatively enacted sales tax 
statutes. However, such delegation does not permit the Tax Commission to create rules and 
regulations that go beyond the scope of the legislation. Exceeding its authority, the Tax 
Commission has enacted rules and regulations defining "admission" and "place of 
amusement, entertainment, or recreation" that go beyond the scope that the 1933 Legislature 
intended. 
The Attorney General Draft Opinion (Exhibit "B") states: 
[OJne of the most well-established rules of statutory 
construction with regard to taxing statutes is that the rule of 
strict construction must be applied against the taxing authority 
and in favor of the taxpayer. Therefore, taxing statutes will not 
be extended beyond the clear and reasonable interpretation of 
their language and if a taxing statute is of doubtful intent, it 
must be construed favorable to the taxpayer. Id at 7-8. 
. . . [F]or the time being we must suffer with the present 
definition of "admission" . . . The customs and practices of 
society change, but unfortunately statutes are often not updated 
and revised to keep up with those changes. Neither the Tax 
Commission or the Attorneys General's Office has the authority 
to ignore the laws of this state and tax activities beyond the 
scope of those laws. The proper remedy of this dilemma must 
be left to the Utah Legislature. 
. . . [T]he term "admission" is strictly inclusive only of a 
charge for the use of seats, tables or other similar 
accommodations. Unless the "admission fee" is for this use, the 
admissions tax . . . cannot be imposed. Id at 14-15. 
The statute does not provide for the taxation of any entertainment or recreational 
activity that does not involve the use of seats or tables. Despite numerous revisions to the 
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sales tax statutes, the legislature has never seen fit to specifically define or expand the 
activities that are subject to sales tax. Consequently, the Tax Commission's attempt to 
expand the scope of activities subject to the tax is invalid. 
By way of analogy, federal law gives guidance regarding the scope of legislative 
delegation that may be given under a tax statute. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 
Aluminum Co.. 142 F.2d 663, 667 (3rd Cir. 1944), the court states: 
It, of course, goes without saying that a . . . regulation may not 
exceed the legislative intent of the [taxing statute] which it 
purports to interpret for administrative purposes. If it does so 
offend, it is of no effect. 
Additionally, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Commodore. Inc.. 135 F.2d 89, 
92 (6th Cir. 1943), the court concluded: 
[I]t is needless to say that what [the legislative body] did not do 
by positive enactment [the tax collecting authority] cannot do by 
regulations. Such regulations cannot amend the law. 
See also Helvering v. Edison Bros. Stores. 133 F.2d 575, 579 (8th Cir. 1943): "The Treasury 
Department cannot, by interpretative regulations, make income of that which is not income 
within the meaning of the revenue acts . . . ." 
Consequently, with a scant statute that must be narrowly interpreted with any 
ambiguities resolve in favor the Galleria, the Tax Commission's attempt to expand the 
activities subject to sales tax beyond the scope of those identified in the statute are void. 
As the Attorney General's Office concluded in its Draft Opinion: 
Confusion, inconsistency, and arbitrary distinctions are 
the result of applying this definition [of "admission"]. 
Nevertheless, the Tax Commission, like the Attorney General's 
Office, is bound by the provisions of the Utah Code . . . with 
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respect to admissions tax. We cannot ignore, change or 
exercise authority beyond what that section allows. 
Therefore, the definition of "admission" is restricted to 
include only the charge imposed for the use of seats, tables or 
other similar accommodations. Unless a fee meets this 
definition, the admission tax . . . is not applicable. If the Utah 
Legislature desires, it may revise that definition to be more 
inclusive of present activities. Id at 16. 
If the Tax Commission seeks to have activities subjected to sales tax which are not 
enumerated in the statute, it must do so by requesting the legislature to amend the statute. 
Without such amendment, its current extension of sales tax to roller skating, batting cage 
and laser tag receipts (none of which require the use of seats or tables) is void as 
unconstitutional. 
V. THE TAX COMMISSION HAS FAILED TO ARTICULATE ANY RATIONAL BASIS 
FOR ITS DETERMINATION THAT ONLY SOME IDENTIFIED ACTIVITIES ARE 
SUBJECT TO SALES TAX.2 
The Tax Commission makes unpersuasive and inconsistent arguments as to why it is 
rational to tax only certain activities falling within the definition of places of "amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation." Each of these arguments are meritless. 
A* The Tax Commission Requests this Court to Determine that the Statute is 
Broad in Scope Yet Limited by Arbitrary Application. 
2The Tax Commission states that constitutional issues were not raised in previous 
proceedings. However, this is not the case. The constitutional issues of vagueness, due 
process and equal treatment were repeatedly expressed by the Galleria in previous 
proceedings. By way of example, the Receiver directs the Court's attention to R. 12, 27, 49, 
50, 52, 66, 67, 85, 123, 124, 145, and 186. Additionally, the Receiver directs the Court's 
attention to the Hearing Transcript 3, 16, 21 and 38. 
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The Tax Commission has requested that this Court adopt a schizophrenic approach 
to the interpretation of the sales tax statute. The Respondent's Brief repeatedly requests 
this Court to adopt a broad meaning of the terms "admissions" and "including." 
For example: 
The phrase "admission to any place of amusement, 
entertainment, or recreation" is broad. Id. at 11. 
The words "amusement, entertainment, or recreation" are 
generic, and do not refer to any specific transaction. This broad 
statement of legislative purpose using generic terms is evidence 
that the enacting legislature intended that unmentioned 
transactions are subject to taxation. Id at 12. 
Yet, on the other hand, the Tax Commission states that this broad definition of activities 
subject to sales tax is not so broad so as to include bowling, miniature golf, golf, driving 
ranges, tennis courts or racquetball courts. Clearly, these arguments of convenience, are 
disingenuous. The Tax Commission should not be permitted to adopt one meaning of the 
statute when convenient and reject this same meaning when not helpful to its position. 
B. There is No Rational Basis the Tax Commission's Taxing Policies, 
The obvious and undisputed purpose of the sales tax statute is to raise revenue. 
There is no rational basis, nor justification, for concluding that the 1933 Legislature only 
intended to tax certain activities falling within the definition of activities subject to the tax. 
In fact, such a conclusion, which the Tax Commission seeks that this Court adopt, is 
meritless. Without a rational basis for distinguishing between taxed and non-taxed activities, 
the statute as applied is unconstitutional. 
In an attempt to find a rational basis for distinguishing between activities, the Tax 
Commission states: 
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[T]he Commission held that admissions to both the batting cage 
and laser tag were taxable because they occurred within an 
"enclosed area." The Commission found roller skating taxable 
because it was specifically mentioned in an administrative rule. 
Accordingly, the Commission's rules and decision rest upon 
paid entrance into a specific place. (Emphasis in original.) 
Respondent's Brief at 14-15. 
Clearly, this argument cannot be supported. If the imposition of the tax is based on 
admittance to an "enclosed area," other recreational activities in a much more enclosed area 
must also be subject to the sales tax. As the Receiver pointed out in his Brief, a racquetball 
court, for which an entrance fee is charged, is a much more "enclosed area" than is the 
batting cage. Yet the Tax Commission seeks to persuade this Court that only the admission 
to the less defined area of the batting cage or the roller skating rink falls within the 
definition of "admission to any place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation," while 
admission to a racquetball court (a windowless, rectangular enclosure with four cement walls 
and a small door generally requiring crouching to gain entrance) does not.3 The Tax 
Commission's arguments are meritless and as applied, the sales tax statute is 
unconstitutional as arbitrary, capricious and lacking any rational basis in application. 
3The Tax Commission apparently believes that a comparison of the discriminatory taxing 
practices of the Tax Commission is a request for an advisory opinion. The Receiver does 
not seek a determination of whether racquetball or tennis are taxable activities, rather, only 
seeks to point out to the Court the discriminatory application of the statute. Clearly, 
pointing out how other parties are being treated vis a vis the complaining party is essential 
to any equal protection argument. If a court could not look to the treatment of other 
parties not before the court, no court could ever find equal protection violations since it is 
that comparison that justifies a finding of unconstitutionality. 
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CONCLUSION • RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Receiver respectfully requests that this Court find that none of the activities 
conducted at the Galleria are subject to the collection and payment of Utah Sales Tax. 
In the alternative, if this Court should find, by adopting the Tax Commission's broad 
interpretation of the sales tax statute, that the activities conducted at the Galleria are 
subject to sales tax, the Receiver respectfully requests that this Court find that the Tax 
Commission's methods of collection are unconstitutional since these actions discriminate, 
without any rational basis, among activities clearly falling within the definition (as defined 
by the Tax Commission) of activities subject to sales tax. 
DATED this | g^day of June, 1993. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Stephen W. Rupp y ^ 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
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AUDITING DIVISION OF THE UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
ALAN V. FUNK, COOPERS & LYBRAND, 
Intervenor. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' 
JURISDICTION 
No. 930053-CA 
Alan V. Funk, the Receiver appointed over the 49th Street Galleria, and an 
intervening party in the above-entitled action (the "Receiver"), hereby respectfully submits 
his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Utah Court of Appeals' 
Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether (i) the actual issuance date of a final order by the Utah State Tax 
Commission or (ii) the deemed denial date, governs the commencement of the 30 day 
period for requesting judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14(3)(a) (1992)? 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
In the spring of 1984, The 49th Street Galleria (the "Galleria") opened for business 
in Murray City, Utah. 
Admission to the Galleria is free with charges being imposed for each of the activities 
in which a patron desires to participate. Additionally, patrons of the Galleria are free to 
use without charge, numerous tables, chairs and benches located throughout the Galleria. 
In the spring of 1984, the Galleria requested the Audit Division of the Utah State 
Tax Commission (the 'Tax Commission") to make a determination of whether the planned 
recreational activities would be subject to Utah Sales Tax. 
In May of 1984, Kenneth Cook of the Tax Commission informed the Galleria that 
receipts from the batting cages and roller skating would be subject to Utah Sales Tax. 
Believing the previous determination was inaccurate and/or poorly reasoned, the 
Galleria requested an additional review of its operations by the Tax Commission. 
On August 2, 1984, George M. Loertscher, Office Auditor of the Tax Commission, 
informed the Galleria that the batting cages, miniature golfing, roller skating, bowling and 
speed pitching (radar gun) were not subject to sales tax, however the rental of equipment 
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was subject to such tax. 
Believing this information to be the definitive word, the Galleria did not collect sales 
tax on any of the activities identified in Loertscher's letter. 
At the request of the Galleria, the Tax Commission requested the Attorney's General 
Office to prepare an opinion regarding the application of sales tax to the Galleria's 
activities. 
An "Informal Opinion" was prepared by the Attorney's General Office in September, 
1985. The conclusions of the report were unfavorable to the Tax Commission's current 
methods of imposition and collection of sales tax and the Tax Commission requested the 
Attorney's General Office to reconsider the matter. Thereafter, no formal opinion was 
prepared or released. 
Subsequent to its opening, the Galleria added a laser chase game to its activities 
portfolio. 
Based on Loertscher's letter that no other activities in the Galleria were subject to 
sales tax, the Galleria reasonably believed that the laser chase game was also not subject 
to sales tax. 
In late 1989 or early 1990, the Tax Commission audited the Galleria and assessed 
additional sales tax on the Galleria's receipts from its batting cages, amusement rides, roller 
skating rink, laser chase game and food sales. 
On November 20,1991, the Tax Commission issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
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of Law and Final Decision confirming the prior decision that receipts from the Galleria's 
batting cages, roller skating rink and laser chase game were taxable. (R. 71.) 
On December 10, 1991, the Galleria timely filed Petitioner's Request for 
Reconsideration. (R. 64.) 
On January 3, 1992, the Utah Attorney's General Office, on behalf of the Auditing 
Division of the Tax Commission, filed Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petitioner's 
Petition for Reconsideration. (R. 54.) 
On January 21, 1992, the Galleria filed Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Brief in 
Opposition to Petition for Reconsideration. (R. 48.) 
On March 10,1992, the Tax Commission issued its final Order (the "Order") (a copy 
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A") denying Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration. 
(R. 42.) 
On April 7, 1992, 28 days after issuance of the final Order, the Galleria timely filed 
its Petition for Review of Order with the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 40.) 
ARGUMENT 
I. JURISDICTION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IS APPROPRIATE SINCE THE 
PETITION FOR REVIEW WAS TIMELY FILED. 
A. The Plain Meaning of the Statute Provides that the Petition for Review was 
Timely Filed. 
Statutory law requires that a petition for judicial review be filed within 30 days of the 
final agency action. The determinative statute, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14(3)(a) (1992), 
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provides: 
A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency 
action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting 
the final agency action is issued or is considered to have been 
issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly, the Galleria's Petition for Review (the "Petition") was timely filed. The "final 
agency action" (the Order denying the Galleria's Request for Reconsideration of the alleged 
tax obligation) was issued on March 10,1992. (R. 42.) On April 7, 1992, only 28 days after 
the final agency action, the Galleria filed its Petition, well within the 30 day period provided 
by the statute. (R. 40.) Therefore, the Petition was timely filed in full compliance with the 
statutory provisions. Consequently, this Court has jurisdiction over the Galleria's appeal. 
B. The Tax Commission's Actual Order Denying the Request for 
Redetermination of the Tax Commission Should Control Over any Deemed 
Denial, 
The issue of compliance with Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14(3)(a) (1992) where the Tax 
Commission actually issued an order constituting the final agency action after the date that 
the Tax Commission is deemed to have denied the request for redetermination, is 
apparently an issue of first impression. The Tax Commission argues that in the event that 
no order granting or denying the request for reconsideration is issued within 20 days of the 
request, the 30 period in which to request a judicial review, commences upon the expiration 
of the 20 day period, regardless of the actions taken by the parties thereafter. However, a 
more reasoned approached would conclude the opposite. 
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In Dustv's v. Utah State Tax Commission, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1992), the Utah 
Supreme Court placed great weight on the "Notice" provision contained in the final order 
of the Tax Commission. This "Notice" provision is substantially identical to the one 
contained in the Order received by the Galleria on March 10, 1992. This provision 
provides: 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order 
[the Order provides: "after the date of final order"] to file in 
Supreme Court a petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. 
§§63-46b-13(l), 63-46b-14(2)(a). 
Analyzing this provision, the court concluded: 
For . . . the guidance of all those who petition for judicial 
review from agency action, we hold that the date the order 
constituting the final agency actions issues is the date the order 
bears on its face. 
To summarize, Dusty's time to seek judicial review . . . 
requir[ed] it to file its petition for judicial review within thirty 
days after the order constituting final agency action was issued. 
The order was issued on the date it bore on its face. Id. at 9. 
Applying this standard as enunciated by the Supreme Court, clearly the final agency 
action occurred on March 10, 1992 when the Tax Commission issued its final Order. 
Certainly, the Tax Commission must admit that the deemed denial date was not the final 
agency action. "An agency order is not final so long as it reserves something for further 
decision by the agency." Parkdale Care Center v. Frandsen. 194 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 29 
(Utah App. 1992). Therefore, the deemed denial date could not constitute final agency 
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action (thereby commencing the running of the 30 day period for requesting judicial review) 
since, as the record shows, on March 10, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its final Order. 
Through that date, the Tax Commission had "reserved something for further decision." 
After the issuance of the final Order, the Tax Commission, then and only then, relinquished 
all jurisdiction to the Galleria's appeal of the alleged sales tax liability. 
As stated both by the Dusty's court and the Notice as contained in the Order, the 
Galleria had 30 days from March 10, 1992 to file its petition for judicial review. Having 
filed its petition for judicial review on April 7, 1992, only 28 days after final agency action, 
the request was timely. Therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to decide the Galleria's appeal 
on the merits. 
C. The Parties, by Their Actions, Extended the Deadline Upon Which the 
Request for Reconsideration was Deemed Denied, 
While the Receiver acknowledges that the 30 day period in which to request judicial 
review cannot be waived or extended by the consent of the parties, any other time period 
prescribed by the Administrative Procedures Act (Chapter 46b) (including the period in 
which a request for reconsideration is deemed denied) can be extended. See Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-l(9) (1992). 
Clearly by their actions, all parties intended to (and did) extend the time period in 
which the request for reconsideration was deemed denied. The Petitioner's Request for 
Reconsideration was filed by the Galleria on December 10, 1991. Assuming arguendo that 
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the Tax Commission's interpretation of the statute is correct, the Request for 
Reconsideration was deemed denied 20 days later, December 30, 1991. According to the 
Tax Commission's interpretation, upon this deemed denial date, the rights and obligations 
of the parties became fixed. If in fact this deemed denial constituted the final agency action 
for purposes of filing a petition for judicial review, neither the Attorney's General Office 
nor the Tax Commission would have any need or obligation to proceed with the Request 
for Reconsideration. Yet the actions of both the Attorney's General Office and the Tax 
Commission suggest that neither considered the deemed denial to constitute final agency 
action. 
On January 3, 1992, the Attorney's General Office filed Respondent's Brief in 
Opposition to Petitioner's Petition for Reconsideration with the Tax Commission. Clearly 
the Attorney's General Office didn't considered the deemed denial date as governing since 
its opposition was filed four days after the deemed denial date. If the matter was closed 
and the request denied, as the Attorney's General Office now asserts, why then was there 
any need to file its opposition after the matter was allegedly closed. 
Additionally, on March 10, 1992, the Tax Commission issued its final Order denying 
the Galleria's Request for Reconsideration. Under the Attorney's General Office 
interpretation of the statute, the Galleria's request was moot after December 30, 1991. In 
fact, under this interpretation, the Tax Commission would no longer even have jurisdiction 
over the matter after the deemed denial date. The Attorney's General Office interpretation 
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is clearly erroneous. 
The Tax Commission had jurisdiction over the Galleria's tax dispute through the 
issuance of the final Order on March 10, 1992. Had the Tax Commission ruled positively 
on the Request for Reconsideration, the Attorney's General Office would not argue that the 
Tax Commission no longer had jurisdiction to resolve the matter after the deemed denial 
date. Therefore, the deemed denial is but a presumption that is completely rebutted by the 
actions of the parties. Consequently, this Court has jurisdiction since the petition for judicial 
review was filed 28 days after the final Order was issued by the Tax Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
Within 28 days of the issuance of the final Order by the Tax Commission, the 
Galleria timely filed its Petition for Review of Order with the Utah Supreme Court. 
Additionally, the actions of the parties show an intent to extend the period in which the Tax 
Commission could respond to the Galleria's Request for Reconsideration past the deemed 
denial date. Therefore, since the Galleria fully complied with the law, this Court has 
jurisdiction. 
DATED this day of April, 1993. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Stephen W. Rupp 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
THE 49TH STREET GALLERIA, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH ST\TE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Appeal No, 90-1055 
Account No. D14926 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
upon a Petition for Reconsideration, dazed December 10, 1991, filed 
by the Petitioner as a result of the Commission's final decision 
dated November 20, 1991. 
FINDINGS 
Utah Administrative Rule R861-1-5A(P) provides that 
a Petition for Reconsideration "will allege as grounds for 
reconsideration either a mistake in law or fact, or the discovery 
of new evidence." Under this rule, the Tax Commission may exercise 
its discretion in granting or denying a Petition for 
Reconsideration. The points raised in Petitioner's Petition for 
Reconsideration are discussed below, in the order of their 
presentation. 
2. Petitioner argues that because it was advised by 
Audit Division staff that several of its other activities were not 
subject to sales tax, Petitioner was justified in concluding that 
Appeal No. 90-1055 
its laser chase game was also not taxable. Petitioner's argument 
overlooks the fact that it had also been advised by others on the 
Audit Division staff that its activities were subject to sales tax. 
Petitioner chose to accept the advice to its liking and reject the 
contrary advice. Then, without further discussion of the matter 
with Audit Division staff, Petitioner concluded that the laser 
chase game was also not subject to tax. The laser chase game had 
not existed when Audit Division staff initially reviewed 
Petitioner's operation. 
In its previous Order, the Commission waived retroactive 
application of sales tax to those specific activities where 
Petitioner received conflicting advice from different members of 
Audit Division staff. Petitioner did not receive conflicting 
advice regarding the taxability of the laser chase game. The 
Commission therefore reaffirms its decision that the laser chase 
game is subject to sales tax. 
3. Petitioner also contends the Commission did not 
respond to its challenge to the administration rules under which 
sales tax was imposed on Petitioner's various activities. In 
effect, Petitioner argues that such rules exceed the scope of 
Utah's Sales Tax Act. The Commission recognizes that payment of 
sales tax cannot be required other than as authorized by the Gales 
Tax Act. However, the Commission is authorized to prescribe rules 
in conformity with the Act to ascertain and assess the tax imposed 
-2-
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by the Act. (See Utah Code Ann. §59-12-118.) The rules upon which 
the assessment was made in this case are an application of the 
foregoing rulemaking authority. The rules themselves have remained 
unchanged for many years, with no legislative direction to the 
contrary. The Commission therefore finds no meri-c in Petition's 
challenge to those rules. 
4. Petitioner contends that §59-12-103(1 ) (f) of the 
Sales Tax Act and the administrative rules pertaining to that 
portion of the Act are unconstitutionally vague. Petitioner has 
framed its objections in conclujsionary language, with no citation 
of authority and minimal analysis. The Commission therefore 
rejects Petition's challenge -co the constitutionality of the 
statute and rules. 
5. Petitioner further argues that no logical distinction 
can be drawn between bowling, which is not subject to sales tax, 
and batting cages, which are subject to tax. The Commission 
recognizes that distinctions between the two activities are 
difficult to draw. The exemption of bowling from sales tax is 
largely historical and perhaps would not exist if a fresh look at 
the issue were possible. Even so, the fact that receipts from 
bowling may have been excluded farom taxation for historical reasons 
does not require that receipts from batting cages also be excluded; 
where such receipts are otherwise subject to sales tax under the 
Sales Tax Act. 
-3-
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6. The Petitioner also contends that it has overpaid 
other sales taxes and is therefore entitled to an offset against 
the sales tax liability imposed by the audit which is the subject 
of this appeal. The Petitioner did not pursue such a position 
during the hearing in this matter, nor has any specific claim for 
refund been submitted. Petitioner may claim such a refund in the 
manner provided by law and regulation. 
7. Finally, the Commission must correct Petitioner's 
misstatements regarding a draft informal opinion prepared during 
1985 by an Assistant Utah Attorney General. Petitioner contends 
the Commission concealed the opinion because it was favorable to 
Petitioner's position. First# the so called opinion is merely a 
draft that was never signed, never approved by the Attorney General 
and never accepted by the Commission. Second, the Commission has 
made no effort to conceal the draft. The Petitioner has a copy of 
the draft, which has been made a part of the record in this matter. 
The draft is not binding on the Commission, and the Commission has 
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DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is the decision and order of 
the Utah State Tax Commission that the Petition for Reconsideration 
is denied. It is so ordered. 
DATED this /n^1 day of ^ r y - X - , 1992. 
DER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
>e B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
sO (hiawitfju0± 
/ S. Blaine Willes 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have thirty (30) days after the date of final order to 
file in Supreme Court a petition for judicial review. Utah Code 
Ann. §§63-4613-13(1), 63-46b-14 ( 2) (a) . ,<^>77T>^ 
ANsd/90-1U55.ord 
CO \ 
X - ' 
it 
•>" < v : 
h 0. "v 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
49th STREET GALLERIA, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
ALAN V. FUNK, COOPERS & LYBRAND, 
Intervenor. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES IN 




Alan V. Funk, the Receiver appointed over the 49th Street Galleria, and an 
intervening party in the above-entitled action (the "Receiver"), hereby respectfully submits 
his Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Utah Court of 
Appeals' Jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether (i) the actual issuance date of a final order by the Utah State Tax 
Commission or (ii) the deemed denial date, governs the commencement of the 30 day 
period for requesting judicial review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14(3)(a) (1992)? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 26, 1993, this Court requested the parties to brief the issue of 
whether this Court had jurisdiction to consider the Receiver's petition for judicial review. 
2. The single issue with regards to jurisdiction is whether the deemed denial date 
or the actual final agency action (if after the deemed denial date) should govern for 
purposes of commencing the 30 day period allowed for requesting judicial review. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT RECENTLY REJECTED THE TAX COMMISSIONS5 
ARGUMENT THAT THE JUDICIAL REVIEW PERIOD COMMENCES ON THE 
DEEMED DENIAL DATE WHEN A FINAL ORDER IS ISSUED THEREAFTER, 
In the matter currently before this Court, the Tax Commission has made the 
argument that the deemed denial date should commence the period in which a party can 
request judicial review, even if a final agency order is issued after the deemed denial date. 
This argument was recently rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. In the case Harper 
Investments. Inc. et. al. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. Supreme 
Court No. 920310, currently before the Supreme Court, the Tax Commission argued that the 
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction since the period in which the taxpayer could request 
judicial review had expired based on the deemed denial date. See Reply Memorandum, p. 
3-4, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." However, the Supreme Court 
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rejected this argument and denied the Tax Commission's Motion to Dismiss Petitioner's 
Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction. A copy of the Supreme Court's denial of the Tax 
Commission's motion is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
Consequently, this Court should also find that it appropriately has jurisdiction to 
review the above-reference matter and thereby reject the Tax Commission's argument that 
the period to seek judicial review commences on the deemed denial date when a final order 
is issued after the deemed denial date. 
CONCLUSION 
The precedent of the Utah Supreme Court should be followed by this Court in 
finding that it appropriately has jurisdiction when a petition for review is timely filed after 
a final order is issued regardless of a statutory deemed denial date. 
DATED this J ^ day of May, 1993. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
?p" \ 




I hereby certify that on the 7th day of May, 1993, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Utah Court 
of Appeals' Jurisdiction was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Lavar F. Christensen 
7050 Union Park Ave., Suite 420 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Rick L. Carlton 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 south State, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
fllIl~&Ui&. 
JAN C. GRAHAM (#1231) 
Attorney General 
CLARK L. SNELSON (#4673) 
Assistant Attorney General 
36 South State, #1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-3200 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
HARPER INVESTMENTS, INC., ] 
HARPER SAND AND GRAVEL, INC., ) 
HARPER EXCAVATING, INC., and ) 
HARPER CONTRACTING, INC., ] 
Petitioners, 
vs. ] 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM 
1 Supreme Court No. 920310 
The Utah State Tax Commission, hereinafter 
"Respondent", submits this Memorandum in reply to the 
Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
The issue this Court must decide is whether an 
administrative agency, by accepting a tardy petition for 
reconsideration, can extend or revive a right to appeal beyond 
the thirty day limit stated in Utah Code Ann- § 63-46b-14(3)(a). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are determinative of this motion: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-I4(3)(a) which requires an appeal to be 
filed within 30 days of a final agency action; Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-13(1)(a) which permits a petition for reconsideration of 
final agency action to be filed within 20 days of such action; 
and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(9) which provides an administrative 
agency with the authority to lengthen or shorten any of the time 
periods in the Administrative Procedures Act, "except those 
periods established for judicial review." 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TIME FOR SEEKING JUDICIAL REVIEW WAS NOT TOLLED AND 
CANNOT BE EXTENDED. 
A. The January 9, 1992 decision was final after 30 days. 
Utah Code Ann. 59-1-504 states: 
The action of the Commission on the taxpayer's 
Petition for Redetermination of Deficiency shall 
be final 30 days after the date of mailing of the 
Commission's Notice of Agency Action. All tax, 
interest, and penalties are due 30 days from the 
date of mailing unless taxpayer seeks judicial 
review. 
Section 63-46b-14(3)(a) sets the requirements for judicial review 
of final agency action. That section states: 
A party shall file a Petition for Judicial 
Review of Final Agency Action within 30 days 
after the date that the order constituting 
the final agency action is issued or is 
considered to have been issued under 
Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). 
2 
The order is issued when signed by the Commission. Dustv/s 
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1992). 
Section 63-46-13 allows a party to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the agency "within 20 days after the date 
that an order is issued/' "if the order would otherwise 
constitute final agency action." Under § 63-46-13(3)(b) an Order 
denying a Request for Reconsideration is deemed to be issued 20 
days after the filing of the request if no action is taken by the 
commission. Petitioner failed to file a Request for 
Reconsideration within 20 days as required by § 63-46b-13, 
therefore that clause does not aid Petitioner. 
Even if the Commission could extend the time period for 
filing for reconsideration and thus extend the time for judicial 
review, Petitioner's appeal is untimely under the language of 
these controlling statues. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l3(3)(b) 
states than Order denying a Petition for Reconsideration is 
deemed to be issued 20 days after the filing of the request if no 
action is taken by the Commission. Petitioners filed their 
Motion for Reconsideration on May 4, 1992. (R. 11) No action 
was taken by the Commission within 20 days. Therefore, pursuant 
to § 63-46b-13(3)(b), an Order was deemed to have issued denying 
the motion on May 25, 1992. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
14(3)(a), Petitioners "shall file a Petition for Judicial Review 
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within 30 days after the date the Order . . . is considered to 
have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b)." Therefore, 
even under Petitioner's theory that the Commission could extend 
the time for judicial review by issuing an Order on their 
untimely Motion for Reconsideration, Petitioners would have had 
to appeal the Order that was deemed to have issued by June 25, 
1992. Petitioner did not file until July 1, 1992. (R. 2) 
Therefore, even if the Commission could extend the time for 
judicial review, Petitioner did not file timely. 
The provisions of §§ 63-46b-13(3)(b) are tied to the 
provisions of § 63-46b-14(3)(a) in order to insure that a Motion 
for Reconsideration cannot indefinitely delay the time for filing 
an appeal. The court should therefore strictly enforce the time 
limit set forth therein. 
B. The Tax Commission's hearing of the Petitioners' tardy 
petition for reconsideration does not render the January 9th 
decision not final for purposes of filing an appeal. 
Federal Courts have long recognized the rule that tardy 
motions for reconsideration cannot toll the statute of 
limitations governing appeals even if the trial court hears the 
motion for reconsideration. The United States Court of Appeals, 
Sixth Circuit, stated the following concerning a tardy petition 
for reconsideration: 
[I]n order to extend the time for appeal a 
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motion for reconsideration must be timely. 
* * * 
That the District Court nonetheless 
considered the motion cannot affect the 
timeliness of the appeal; the District Court 
is without power to enlarge the time for 
making Rule 59(e) motions. 
Denley v. Shearson/American Exp. Inc., 733 F. 2d 39, 41 (6th Cir. 
1984). Other Federal Courts have reached similar conclusions. 
In Smith V. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 157 (3rd Cir. 1988); the court 
found "An untimely motion, even if acted upon by the district 
court, cannot toll the time for filing a notice of appeal." See 
Butler v. Coral Volkswagen, Inc., 804 F.2d 613, 617 (11th Cir. 
1986); Gribble v. Harris, 625 F.2d 1173, 1174 (5th. Cir. 1980). 
Likewise, in Martinez v. Trainer, 556 F.2d 818, 820 
(7th Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit stated in regards to an 
untimely motion for a new trial: 
The district court's assuming to hear and 
determine a belated motion for a new trial 
cannot thereby affect the finality of the 
judgment and enlarge the time for taking an 
appeal. (Emphasis added)• 
The court In Martinez declined to look beyond the technical time 
requirements of filing an appeal. Rather, the court noted that 
"important substantive policies regarding the finality of 
judgments . . . " existed which prevented the court from ignoring 
the technical requirements associated with filing an appeal. Id. 
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The uniform holdings running throughout these Federal cases 
is that statute of limitations on appeals cannot be stayed by a 
tardy post trial petition even if it is heard by the trial court. 
These holdings reinforce the common sense notion that one cannot 
"toll" the running of a limitations period by actions taken after 
the period has run. Under the clear language of § 59-12-504, the 
Commission's Order became final since judicial review was not 
sought within 30 days of the date of issuance. The actions of 
Petitioner after the running of the limitations period cannot 
serve to "toll" the period. 
Section 63-46b-l(9) relied on by Petitioner is consistent 
with the holdings of the federal cases as cited in prohibiting 
the agency from extending the time for judicial review. Since 
the period was not tolled prior to the Order becoming final, and 
cannot be extended by the Commission pursuant to the express 
language of the statute, Petitioner's appeal is untimely and 
should be dismissed. 
II. THE PETITIONERS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THEY DID NOT 
RECEIVE NOTICE OF THE JANUARY 9, 1992 DECISION. 
Petitioners have argued in their memorandum in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss that they did not receive 
notice of the January 9, 1992 decision. However, the April 15, 
1992 order granting the Petitioner's permission to file a tardy 
petition for reconsideration noticeably did not contain any 
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findings of fact or conclusions of law. Thus, there has been no 
specific finding by the Tax Commission that the petitioners' did 
not receive notice. (R. 30). 
The record clearly indicates that notice of the January 
9, 1992 decision was sent to the Petitioners' Attorneys. See 
Respondent's Memorandum In Opposition to Petitioners' Motion & 
Memorandum to Extend Time for Filing Notice of Appeal. The 
evidence also indicates that the Petitioners' Attorneys may have 
received notice since they timely responded to the following 
documents with similar mailing certificates as the January 9, 
1992 decision: The Respondents Answer to Petitioners' Petition 
for Redetermination, dated January 10, 1991 (R.667); the Tax 
Commission's Prehearing Order, March 28, 1991 (R.660); The 
Stipulation Motion to Extend Scheduling Order Dates, June 14, 
1991 (R.275); and finally, the Notice of Hearing, March 28, 1991 
(R.656). 
The notices were mailed to the attention of Thomas Nelson of 
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall and McCarthy since Mr. Nelson filed 
the Petitions with a letter to the Tax Commission identifying 
himself as the Petitioners' representative and asking that 
verification of filing be sent to his attention. (R.668) 
Petitioners' made no request to have the mailing certificate 
changed following Mr. Nelson's departure from the firm despite 
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the fact that the other correspondence from the Commission had 
come addressed to him. The affidavits filed by Respondent 
establish that the notice was timely mailed to the same address 
as other correspondence received by Petitioner. It is fair to 
assume that the Order was received and that Petitioner's failure 
to respond was due to miscommunication caused by Mr. Nelson 
leaving the firm rather than by the post office failing to 
deliver the mail. 
CONCLUSION 
The hearing of a tardy petition for reconsideration had no 
effect on the finality of the January 9, 19 9 2 Order. To conclude 
otherwise would grant the Tax Commission power to extend the time 
period for seeking judicial review. Section 63-46b-l(a) relied 
on by Petitioner clearly states that the Commission's Order 
cannot have that effect. The Order became final prior to 
Petitioner taking any action which could be construed to toll the 
running of the time for filing for judicial review. Therefore, 
Petitioner's appeal is untimely and should be dismissed. 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of February, 1993. 
CLARK L. SNELSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM on this /<T "^day of February, 
1993 by first class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Robert A. Peterson 
Richard C. Skeen 
Robert w. Payne 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Secretary 
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The 49th Street Galleria, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, 
Respondent. 
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</• M*ryT. Noonan 
' Cierk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No, 930053-CA 
This matter is before the court on its own notice of 
consideration for summary disposition. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary disposition is denied and 
a ruling on the issues raised is deferred until plenary 
presentation and consideration of the case. Utah R. App. P. 
10(f). 
Dated this 
BY THE COURT: 
W day of May, 1993. 
yaZ&/^&C_ 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of May, 1993, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the parties listed below: 
LaVar F. Christensen 
Attorney at Law 
7050 Union Park Avenue, Suite #420 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Stephen W. Rupp 
McKay, Burton & Thurman, Suite 12 00 
Attorneys at Law 
Kennecott Building - 10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Jan Graham 
State Attorney General 
John C. McCarrey 
Assistant Attorney General 
3 6 South State, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 13th day of May, 1993. 
By -i)KW\ '/WllW 
Deputy dlerk 
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September 6, 1985 
Mr. Mark K. Buchi, Chairman 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Heber M. Wells Office Building 
160 East 3 00 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134 
RE: Attorney General Opinion No. 85-40 
Taxability of Admission and Special Events Fees 
Dear Mr. Buchi: 
The following Informal Opinion is in response to your 
letter of May 24, 1985, wherein you requested guidance as to the 
taxation of admission fees. This Opinion will set forth the 
fundamental rules that should govern the taxation of admissions 
receipts and then suggest changes in Tax Commission policy that 
will provide consistent application of the law. 
PACTS 
In Utah, "amount (s) paid for admission to any place of 
amusement, entertainment, or recreation" are subject to sales 
tax. Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-4(d). Further, the definition of 
"admission" states that it "includes seats and tables reserved or 
otherwise, and other similar accommodations and charges made 
therefore." Utah Code Ann. § 59-15-2(9). While at first blush 
it appears that the application of these legislative provisions 
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would be simple, problems surrounding the "admissions tax" have 
burdened the Tax Commission and its staff for many years. 
For example, the Tax Commission presently imposes the 
admissions tax on charges made for swimming pool use, skating 
rink fees, and amusement park rides. However, golfing green 
fees, receipts from bowling alleys, and court fees (tennis, 
racquetball, squash, etc.) are not taxed. According to the Tax 
Commission, the reason for distinguishing the above-categorized 
activities is not necessarily grounded in legal reasoning; 
rather, it is the result of varying practices and interpretations 
of successive administrations which, over the years, have rooted 
themselves i,nto the policies of the Commission. Further, the 
legislative provision that defines "admission" and the Tax 
Commission Rule that defines "place of amusement, entertainment, 
or recreation" are nebulous and difficult to apply in practical 
situations, thus adding to the confusion surrounding the 
admissions tax. 
The difficulty of these problems has made the 
application of the admissions tax unclear in new amusement 
situations such as batting cages, video arcades, and the like. 
Therefore, this Ooinion was requested by the Commission so than 
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an understandable statement of th'e law can be consistently and 
correctly applied with regard to the admissions tax. 
Throughout this Opinion/ reference is made to the 
phrase "seats and tables reserved or otherwise/ and other similar 
accommodations. " For purposes of brevity, we have generically 
referred to this entire quotation as "seats and tables" or 
"seats/tables." However/ we imply therein that all such seats 
and tables, reserved or otherwise, and other similar 
accommodations (benches/ stoolsf bleachers/ etc.) are included. 
Likewise/ we have used "amusement activity" to refer to the 
phrase;"place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation." 
ISSUE 
What are the principles and standards for determination 
with respect to the admissions tax? 
DISCUSSION 
A. Introduction 
The "admissions tax" was promulgated as part of the 
Emergency Revenue Act of 1933. Other than changes in the taxing 
rate, the language of the provision has remained suDstantially 
the same: "[T]here is levied and there shall be collected and 
paid: (d) A tax . . . of the amount paid for admission to any 
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place of amusement, entertainment, or recreation," Utah Code 
Ann- S 59-15-4 (d) • The term "admission" is legislatively defined 
in Utah Code Amu section 59-15-2(9): "•Admission1 includes 
seats and tables reserved or otherwise, and other similar 
accommodations and charges made therefore, " For the most part, 
the problems which face us in applying the admissions tax stem 
from the determination of what constitutes an "admission." 
Since the controlling source of law in this issue is 
the Utah Code's applicable provisions sections 59-15-4(d) and 5 9-
15-2(9), the major question to be decided is whether the Utah 
Legislature intended to strictly limit "admission" to only 
include activities where the participant uses "seats and tables" 
to enjoy "amusement, entertainment, or recreation/ or if 
itemizing the use of seats and tables is merely an example of one 
type of an "admission-" If the former is true, then the current 
Tax Commission practice of taxing the receipts from swimming pool 
and skating rink charges is improper. However, if the latter is 
true, then the Tax Commission may be in error by not taxing some 
activities that should be subject to the tax (e.g., green fees, 
bowling receipts, and court fees). 
B. Analysis of Utah Statutes 
Since the subject legislative provisions were handed 
down as law in 1933, no written documentation of legislative 
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history is available to aid in determining the legislature's 
intent (written documentation begins in 1953) . Therefore, to 
determine the intent of the Utah Legislature, we must apply 
accepted rules of statutory construction. 
The Utah Legislature's definition of "admissions" 
states that "admission inclndes." As noted earlier, the question 
we must resolve is whether the term "includes" should be a term 
of enlargementr indicating that an "admission" could be something 
else besides the charge for use of seats or tables; or whether 
the tenti "includes" should be a word of limitations where an 
admission could only be that situation where seats/ tables, or 
similar accommodations were used in order to enjoy the amusement 
activity. 
A majority of court holdings state that the word 
"includes" is a word of expansion and enlargement and not one of 
restriction or limitation. £££, e.g. , Schwab v. Ariyoshi, 58 Haw. 
25, 564 P.2d 135, (1977); Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar, 188 Colo. 
216, 533 P.2d 1129, (1975); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. City of 
Chicago, 24 111. App.3d 718, 321 M.E. 2d 293 (1974). Neverthe-
less, considering the context in which the word is used, it can 
be and often is a word of limitation. Se^/ e.g./ Premier 
Products Co. v. Cameron, 240 Or. 123, 400 P.2d 227 (1965). 
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In State v. Monticello Salt Company, 98 P. 549, 34 Utah 458 
(190 8), the Utah Supreme court stated that: 
The word "including/" according to common usage, 
is susceptible to different shades of meaning. 
It may be used in the sense to comprise or 
embrace; to confine or to contain; to express 
the idea that a thing in question constitutes a 
part only of the contents of some other thing; 
as a word of enlargement, and ordinarily imply-
ing that something else has been given beyond 
the general language which precedes it; to add 
to the general clause a species which does not 
naturally belong to it. It is frequently used 
as the equivalent of "also." 
Therefore, in Dtah, the use of the word "includes" is not 
apositive as to whether the term "admissions" as used in section 
59-15-2(9) is exclusive or exemplary of an admission. We must 
examine the context of the usage and other factors to determine 
the meaning of the word "includes. " 
First, the only item listed as an admission is the 
charge for seats and tables, as opposed to a common usage of 
"includes" as a term of enlargement where a list of several items 
are given as an example of what the term means. Second, we 
should note that the phrase "and other similar accommodations" is 
modifying the nouns seats or tables and not modifying the term 
"admission" itself, which would indicate that "includes" was used 
as a term of enlargement. Third, nowhere in the definition is it 
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stated that the term includes seats or tables, but is not limited 
to charges for seats and tables* Fourth/ had the legislature 
intended that the term "admission" would mean something more than 
the charge for seats and tables, it could have easily stated 
otherwise. Finally, considering the time when the definition of 
"admission" and the admission tax itself were promulgated, using 
the common base of seats and tables as the standard for 
determining whether an activity was an admission was likely 
reasonable. Video arcades, batting cages, public golf courses, 
etc., were non-existent in 1933. The major source of amusement 
and entertainment was the theater, picture shows, and sporting 
events. Defining admission as a charge made for seats and 
tables, therefore, was adequate. 
These factors indicate that the term "includes" should 
be a term of limitations and the Utah Legislature's intent was to 
limit the admissions tax applicability to only those activities 
wherein seats and tables were necessary to the enjoyment of the 
amusement activity. 
Moreover, one of the most well-established rules of 
statutory construction with regard to taxing statutes is that the 
rule of strict construction must be applied against the taxing 
authority and in favor of the taxpayer. Therefore, taxing 
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statutes will not be extended beyond the clear and reasonable 
interpretation of their language and if a taxing statute is of 
doubtful intent, it must be construed favorable to the taxpayer. 
Sutherland Stat. Const. § 66.01 (4th Ed.). This rule of 
statutory construction is clearly applicable to the Otah 
Legislative provision section 59-15-4(d) which taxes admission 
Additionally, the very Tax Commission Rule (S33) that 
interprets the statutory definition of "admission" limits its 
substantive content and list of examples to those situations 
which ,are only covered by a strictly construed intrepretation of 
"admission": 
a. The term "admission" means the right or 
privilege to enter into a place including seats 
and tables reserved or otherwise and other 
similar accommodations and charges made there-
for. The amount paid for the right to use a 
reserved seat or any seat in an auditorium, 
theater, circus, stadium, schoolhouse, meeting 
house or gymnasium to view any type of enter-
tainment is taxable. The right to use a table 
at a night club, hotel or roof garden is taxable 
whether such charge is designated as a cover 
charge or any such similar charge, and the 
amount paid for such right is subject: to the 
tax. This is true whether the charge made for 
the use of the seat, table, or similar accommo-
dation is combined with an Admission charge 
proper to form a single ciiarge, or is separate 
and distinct from an admission charge, or is 
itself the sole charge. 
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This Sales Tax Rule implies no application of the 
admissions tax to amusement activities whose fee is for other 
than the use of seats and tables. 
Therefore, considering all of the above factors, it is 
the opinion of the Utah Attorney General that the term 
"admission," as defined by the Qtah Legislature, is strictly 
limited to those situations where seats, tables, or similar 
seating facilities are used by the patrons to engage in the 
amusement activity. To be subject to the admissions tax of 
section 59-15-4(d), the definition, as above construed, must be 
satisfied. 
C. Application to Current Practice 
Construing the definition of "admission" to be limited 
to the charge made for use of seats, tables, etc., will require 
that the Tax Commission change some of its present taxing 
policies with regard to the admissions tax. Subjecting any 
activity to the admissions tax which does not require the use of 
some type of seating facility is not in accord with the 
restrictive definition of "admission." If the fee cnarged is noc 
an "admission" as that term is defined by section 59-15-2(9) and 
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i n t e r p r e t e d by th i s Opinion, then ne i the r can i t be an "admission 
to a p lace of amusement, entertainment or recreation*" 
The charge paid for use of a seat or tab le a t a 
t h e a t e r , movie, stadium, gymnasium, schoolhouse, nightclub, and 
other s imi la r places i s c lear ly subjec t to the admissions tax 
Also, the pr ice paid to r ide on amusement devices located at 
amusement parks, carnivals or f a i r s i s taxable ( th is i s t rue 
whether the price paid i s for an individual r id or unlimited 
use) , as i s the cost of a ski l i f t t i c k e t . 
However, p a r t i c i p a t i o n in a c t i v i t i e s such as golf, 
bowling, swimming, ska t ing , t e n n i s , r acque tba l l , e t c . , cannot be 
taxed by sect ion 59-15-4(d) since they f a i l to meet the 
d e f i n i t i o n of "admission" in tha t the fee paid to pa r t i c ipa te in 
t h i s type of recreat ion i s not for the use of any seat or t ab l e . 
I n c i d e n t a l use of a seat or t ab le may occur, but fee paid for 
these a c t i v i t i e s i s primari ly for use of the f a c i l i t i e s . To 
comport with the s t a tu to ry de f in i t i on of "admission," the use of 
s e a t s or t ab l e s must be necessary or customary in order to view 
the amusement, entertainment, or r ec rea t ion . 
In s i tua t ions where the use of a seat and/or table i s 
only p a r t i a l , the Tax Commission w i l l need to determine whether 
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the use of the seat/table is incidental or necessary to enjoyment 
of the activity. If the use is incidental* then the admissions 
tax will not apply; if the use is necessary, then the admissions 
tax will apply. 
Therefore, the restrictive term "admission" will 
continue to tax many of the same activities, but will require 
that the Tax Commission alter its taxing policies where they have 
been imposing the admissions tax on certain participative 
activities (e.g., swimming and skating). 
D. Practical Considerations 
This Opinion has set forth what we believe the proper 
statement of the law in Utah is, according to Utah statute, with 
respect to the admissions tax of Utah Code Ann. section 5 9-15-
4(d) and 59-15-2(9). However, because of the unusual manner in 
which the definition of "admission" was written and the rules of 
statutory construction which control, our interpretation is 
narrow and, therefore, does not tax the large spectrum of 
"admission fees" that for all practical reasons should be subject 
to the tax. The present standards for determination of the 
admissions tax, though they be the standards we must apply, are 
simply inadequate today. 
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Common sense tells us that the price which a patron 
pays to go swimming, skating golfing, bowling, and a host of 
other charges, should logically be subject to the admissions tax. 
This notion is present in Attorney General Opinion No. 7 8-259 
wherein Assistant Attorney General Hark Buchi stated that it was 
the duty of a state municipality to "collect a sales tax on the 
admission price to the swimming pool golf curse and any other 
city-owned recreation facilities." This conclusion seemed so 
clear that, other than applying section 59-15-4(d) and the Sales 
Tax Regulations, no detailed analysis was done. 
Further, the Tax Commission passed a Sales Tax Rule 
(S47) which .states that "[clharges imposed on persons admitted to 
swimming pools, skating rinks and other places of amusement are 
subject to tax." Also, in defining what the phrase "place of 
amusement, entertainment, or recreation" means, the Commission 
said in Sales Tax Rule S34 that "[t]he amount paid for admission 
to such a place is subject to the tax even though such charge 
includes the right of the purchaser to participate in some 
activity within the place." These actions on the parr of the Tax 
Commission indicate that, even though hesitant about: taking the 
admissions tax into.all participative activities, limiting the 
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tax to only those situations where seats/tables are needed is an 
arbitrary and unfair segregation of amusement and recreational 
activities. 
We are not the only state that has had to relegate 
itself to applying a narrowly-written admissions tax. In Graner 
v. Director of Revenue, 193 Kan. 605, 396 P.2d 260 (1964), the 
Kansas Supreme Court refused to impose the Kansas admissions tax 
on bowling alley receipts where the tax was levied against "the 
sale of admissions to any place of amusement, entertainment, or 
recreation." The Kansas statutes gave no definition of the term 
"admission," so the court adopted a standard dictionary 
definition stating that "admission" meant "3a: an act of 
admitting: the fact of being admitted: permission or right to 
enter . . . . 4: price of entrance: fee paid at or for 
entering." 
In response to the argument of the Kansas Attorney 
General that the tax should also apply to the price charged for 
participation in the recreation of bowling, the court held that 
the charge for participation was not the same as a charge for 
entrance to a place: 
[Wlhat the legislature taxed . . . was the 
price of admission to enter a place of amuse-
ment, entertainment or recreation. Had the 
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legislature by its enactment intended to 
impose a tax on charges for participation in 
such activities as bowling, it- could have 
easily done so. The fact that it did not do 
so is persuasive that it was not the intention 
of che legislature to impose a tax on charges 
made for participation in the recreational 
activities. 
id* at p. 264 (emphasis in original). The Utah Legislature's 
definition of "admission" is even more limiting than the 
dictionary definition adopted in Grauer, since the Grauer 
standard of "fee for entrance" is even broader than Utah's "fee 
for use of seats/tables." 
The resolution of this tangled problem is to either: 
1. redefine the term "admission" (section 59-15-2(9)) to include 
a standard meaning "price paid for entrance," as in Grauer and to 
include therein "the price paid to participate in the amusement, 
entertainment, or recreational activity"; or 2. to specifically 
identify in section 59-15-4(d) the activities to be covered by 
the tax, stating that the list is not exclusive but exemplary. 
Either of these approaches will provide a fair, understandable, 
and workable statute. 
However, for the time being we must suffer with the 
present: definition of "admission" as it is found in section 59-
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15-2(9). The customs and practices of society change, but 
unfortunately statutes are often not updated and revised to keep 
up with those changes- Neither the Tax Commission or the 
Attorney General's Office has the authority to ignore the laws of 
this state and tax activities beyond the scope of those laws. 
The proper remedy of this dilemma must be left to the Utah 
Legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
As defined in Utah Code Ann. section 59-15-2(9)/ the 
term "admission* is strictly inclusive only of a charge for the 
use of seats, tables or other similar accommodations. Unless the 
"admission fee" is for this use, the admissions tax of section 
59-15-4(d) cannot be imposed. Further, to engage in or enjoy the 
amusement activity, it must be customary or necessary to use 
seats, tables or other similar accommodations. 
Currently, the Tax Commission is imposing the 
admissions tax on the charges paid to enter a swimming pool or 
skating rink. The imposition of the admissions tax on these 
charges goes beyond the taxing authority granted by section 5 9-
15-4(d), since the charges do not meet the definition of 
"admission" as described above. 
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This Opinion recognizes that the definition of 
"admission" which we must apply is inadequate and does not tax 
many activities that should fall within the admissions tax. 
Confusion, inconsistency, and arbitrary distinctions are the 
result of applying this definition. Nevertheless, the Tax 
Commission, like the Attorney General's Office, is bound by the 
provisions of the Utah code, specifically, section 59-15-2(9) 
with respect to the admissions tax. We cannot ignore, change or 
exercise authority beyond what that section allows. 
Therefore, the definition of "admission" is restricted 
to include only the charge imposed for the use of seats, tables 
or other similar accommodations Unless a fee meets this 
definition, the admissions tax of Utah Code Ann. section 59-15-
4(d) is not applicable. If the Utah Legislature desires, it may 
revise that definition to be more inclusive of present 
activities. 
Sincerely, 
Bryce H. P e t t e y 
A s s i s t a n t At torney General 
Tax & Business Regulation Div. 
BHP/rrm 
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